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Chapter 6
Armed Conflict and the Environment
Conflict over scarce resources, such as minerals, ﬁsh, water, and particularly territory, is a
traditional source of armed struggle. Recently, wide-ranging claims have been made to the
effect that environmental degradation will increase resource scarcity and therefore con-
tribute to an increase in armed conflict. So far, there has been much controversy and little
relevant systematic study of this phenomenon. Most scholarship on the relationship
between resources, the environment, and armed conflict suffers from one or more of the
following problems: (1) there is a lack of clarity over what is meant by ‘environmental
conflict’; (2) researchers engage in deﬁnitional and polemical exercises rather than analysis;
(3) important variables are neglected, notably political and economic factors which have a
strong influence on conflict and mediate the influence of resource and environmental fac-
tors; (4) some models become so large and complex that they are virtually untestable;
(5) cases are selected on values of the dependent variable; (6) the causality of the rela-
tionship is reversed; (7) postulated events in the future are cited as empirical evidence;
(8) studies fail to distinguish between foreign and domestic conflict; and (9) confusion
reigns about the appropriate level of analysis. While no publications are characterized by all
of these problems, many have several of them. This article identiﬁes a few lights in the
wilderness and briefly outlines a program of research.
6.1 War, Resources, and the Environment
‘Nations have often fought to assert or resist control over war materials, energy
supplies, land, river basins, sea passages and other key environmental resources.’1
This passage from the World Commission on Environment and Development
1This article was originally published in Journal of Peace Research 35(3): 381–400, 1998. As can
be seen in the bibliography in this volume, no other article of mine has been reprinted so many
times.
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(Brundtland 1987: 290) summarizes a common view of armed conflict.2 Thus,
Renner et al. (1991: 109) claim that ‘throughout human history, but particularly
since the system of sovereign nation states, struggles over access to and control
over natural resources … have been a root cause of tension and conflict’ and that
‘history provides numerous examples of how states and nations were destabilized
by environmental collapse leading to famine, migration and rebellion’. Galtung
(1982: 99) has argued that ‘wars are often over resources’. Brock (1991: 409)
asserts that ‘control over natural resources has always been important in enabling a
country to wage war’, citing as an example the Paciﬁc War (1879–84) between
Chile and Peru over guano deposits. Westing (1986: particularly Chap. 1 and
Appendix 2) has examined how resource competition has contributed to the onset
of twelve armed confrontations in the 20th century, ranging from the two World
Wars to the Anglo–Icelandic ‘Cod Wars’ of 1972–73. A more ambitious claim is
made by Colinvaux (1980: 10), who asserts that ‘history has been a long pro-
gression of changing ways of life and changing population’, with ‘wars, trade and
empire’ as the results. Ehrlich/Ehrlich (1972: 425) argue that ‘population-related
problems seem to be increasing the probability of triggering a thermonuclear
Armageddon’.
Since the emergence of environmental issues on the international political
agenda in the early 1970s, there has been increasing concern that environmental
disruption is likely to increase the number of disputes originating from competition
for scarce resources.3 Galtung (1982: 99) has argued that ‘destruction of the
environment may lead to more wars over resources’, and suggests that ‘environ-
mental effects make a country more offensive because it is more vulnerable to attack
and because it may wish to make up for the deﬁcit by extending the eco-cycles
abroad, diluting and hiding the pollution, getting access to new resources’. After the
end of the Cold War, similar statements have become very common. Opschoor
(1989: 137) asserts that ‘ecological stress and the consequences thereof may
exacerbate tension within and between countries’, and Lodgaard (1992: 119) has
said that ‘where there is environmental degradation, or acute scarcity of vital
resources, war may follow’. Similarly, the then Norwegian Defense Minister Johan
Jorgen Holst (1989: 123) argued that environmental stress seems likely to become
an increasingly potent contributing factor to major conflicts between nations. In
2Earlier versions of this article were presented at a NATO Advanced Research Workshop ‘Conflict
and the Environment’ at Bolkesjø, Norway; a meeting of the NATO Committee on the Challenges
of the Modern Society Pilot Study Meeting on Environmental Security in Ankara; the Fifth
National Conference in Political Science at Geilo, Norway; at the 38th Annual Convention of the
International Studies Association, Toronto; and at the 1997 Open Meeting of the Human
Dimensions of Global Environmental Change Research Community at Laxenburg, Austria.
Financial support from the United States Institute of Peace is gratefully acknowledged, as is
assistance from Norunn Grande, Håvard Hegre, Cecilie Sundby, and Bjørn Otto Sverdrup. I am
also grateful for comments from guest editor Paul Diehl and two anonymous JPR referees, as well
as Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, Dan Smith, and a number of participants at the various
conferences.
3Recent literature surveys are found in Rønnfeldt (1997) and Smith/Østreng (1997).
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addition, ‘environmental degradation may be viewed as a contribution to armed
conflict in the sense of exacerbating conflicts or adding new dimensions’.
McMichael (1993: 321) believes that ‘the end-stage of unequal power relations and
economic exploitation in the world will be tension and struggle over life-sustaining
resources. Fossil fuels, freshwater, farming and ﬁsh have already become the foci of
armed struggles’. Also on an alarmist note, Kaplan (1994), in a widely publicized
article in the Atlantic Monthly, predicted a coming world anarchy—sparked in large
measure by environmental degradation. The Secretary-General of the Habitat
conference in 1996 told participants that ‘the scarcity of water is replacing oil as a
flashpoint for conflict between nations…’ (Lonergan 1997: 375).
To this thinking, the prime resource seen as worth ﬁghting for is obviously
territory, as in the conflict-ﬁlled expansion of European settlers in North America or
the border conflicts between China and several neighbors. A more recent variety of
territorial conflict concerns the economic zone on the continental shelf, a matter of
dispute between most countries which are neighbors at sea and which may raise tiny
islands to monumental importance because of their consequences for boundaries at
sea. Thus, there are no less than six claimants to all or part of the Spratly Islands in
the South China Sea (Denoon/Brams 1997), and the use of force cannot be ruled
out. Another is strategic raw materials: the strategic importance accorded to
Indochina in the 1950s was justiﬁed by US President Eisenhower—in the statement
that made famous the ‘domino theory’—with reference to the importance of raw
materials such as tin, tungsten, and rubber.4 Some such raw materials are closely
tied to arms production, others are simply seen as essential to the economy. A third
is sources of energy, the most obvious example being oil supplies from the Persian
Gulf, a factor in several recent conflicts. A fourth is water, such as the Atatürk dam
project in Turkey, which may result in a water shortage in Syria; or the Nile project,
which might provoke a serious downstream-upstream conflict between Egypt and
Ethiopia. A UN study identiﬁed 214 major river systems shared by two or more
countries, many of them subject to unresolved disputes (Renner 1996: 619). A ﬁfth
resource is food, including grains and ﬁsheries. Disagreements regarding shared
ﬁsheries resources have occasioned numerous confrontations between ﬁshing
vessels and armed vessels of coastal states, including three ‘Cod Wars’ between
Iceland and the United Kingdom in the period 1958–76 (Bailey 1997). Increasing
food prices have given rise to domestic violent riots; at the international level, food
sales have been used for strategic leverage.
The basic causal chain in this argument runs as follows: population growth &
high resource consumption per capita → deteriorated environmental condi-
tions → increasing resource scarcity → harsher resource competition → greater
risk of violence.
4Statement made by President Eisenhower in a press conference on 7 April 1954, cf. (1954) Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Eisenhower: 382, quoted from LaFeber (1980: 163).
For other statements by US policymakers in the same vein, see Kolko (1985: 76), who ﬁnds such
references to raw materials to be ‘integral to American policy considerations from the inception’.
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Not everyone includes all the elements of this causal chain or puts the emphasis
in the same place. Biologists frequently single out population growth as the key
causal factor; environmentalists tend to start with environmental degradation; and
critics of capitalism tend to emphasize excessive consumption in the First World
and the need for the First World to restrict its consumption if the Third World is to
be allowed to catch up. There is not necessarily any contradiction between these
positions, but they stress different parts of the causal chain. Homer-Dixon and
associates use a tripartite division of scarcity (Percival/Homer-Dixon 1998: 282–
285): supply-induced (which corresponds to environmental deterioration above),
demand-induced (resulting from population growth), and structural (due to
inequality, which is not included in the model above).
Despite numerous pronouncements on the relationship between conflict and the
environment, there is no consensus on the causal mechanisms. Indeed, several
writers have questioned the overall argument. Deudney (1991) and Simon (1996)
have listed a number of problems with the notion of increasing resource scarcity.5
First, it ignores human inventiveness and technological change, both of which have
vastly increased agricultural yields and the rate of resource extraction from raw
material lodes. Modern industry is high on processing, which essentially means
intensive in capital, technology, and energy, rather in raw materials like minerals.
Second, the pessimistic argument overlooks the role of international trade; most
scarcities are local rather than universal. Third, raw materials can be substituted, so
being dependent on a particular resource today is not the same as being vulnerable
tomorrow if the supply lines should be choked off. Fourth, in the event of increasing
scarcity, prices are likely to rise, leading to greater economizing, and further
technological change, trade, and substitution. In fact, however, these processes have
been sufﬁciently effective in recent decades for raw materials prices to fall even
though global consumption of natural resources has increased. Thus, while the
international best-seller The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972) predicted
imminent scarcities in a number of minerals, such as copper, the trend since then
has in fact been in the opposite direction.
Even in the event of scarcities which could theoretically be overcome by
imperialist behavior, the major powers have learnt—from Vietnam, Afghanistan,
and a number of other wars in the Third World—that subduing a resisting popu-
lation, however technologically backward, is a very costly affair. On the basis of an
overall ‘cornucopian’ view where the human being is the most essential resource,
Simon (1989) argues that, rather than furthering war, population growth is likely to
end it. Instead of armed conflict, Deudney argues, conflicts over resources such as
water may lead to joint exploitation of the resources and a network of common
interests. Similarly, resource scarcity based on environmental degradation would
encourage joint efforts to halt the degradation. Levy (1995) also argues that
5For general broadsides against environmental pessimism, see Maddox (1972), Bolch/Lyons
(1993), Bailey (1995), and Easterbrook (1995). A recent response is found in Ehrlich/Ehrlich
(1996).
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environmental degradation is unlikely on its own to be a major cause of armed
conflict; further, that it is not a national security issue for the United States, and is
even unlikely to prove interesting as a research area unless seen in conjunction with
other causes of armed conflict.
Many of the more balanced statements on environmental factors in conflict are
rather cautious about drawing causal links. Westing (1986: 6), for instance, con-
cludes only that ‘what the ultimate cause or causes of war might be deﬁes simple
explanation and is, at any rate, far beyond the scope of this analysis’. Brock (1991:
410) concedes that the importance of natural resources as a source of conflict is
easily exaggerated, citing Lipschutz/Holdren (1990: 121), who argue that despite
Eisenhower’s famous ‘domino’ statement and numerous other policy pronounce-
ments, the problem of access to resources has not ‘really played such a central role
in shaping US foreign and military policy in recent decades’. The same holds for
other nations, Lipschutz/Holdren argue, although resources have frequently served
as rationalizations for public consumption ‘in support of policies with much more
elaborate origins’ (Lipschutz/Holdren 1990: 123).
Nevertheless, the overall impression of this literature is one of strong pessimism,
stated with considerable force. The object of this article is to examine the research
foundations for such claims. I begin with a brief summary of systematic research in
this area, and go on to discuss nine common theoretical and methodological
problems in the extant literature. Finally, I point to some recent work which seems
to be moving in a promising direction and outline some priorities for developing
this work further.
6.2 Systematic Research
Neither in the environmental literature nor in studies of the causes of war or civil
war has there been much systematic research (quantitative or comparative) on the
relationship between resources and environmental factors and armed conflict.
A number of studies summarized in Tir/Diehl (1998) have related population
density and population growth to conflict and violence. Strictly speaking, these are
not measures of either resource scarcity or environmental degradation. But they
may provide a good indirect measure, in that a high value indicates a high or
increasing load on resources and the environment. Tir and Diehl found that the
literature did suggest a link between population variables and international conflict,
but that there was little theoretical or empirical consensus beyond that. In their own
empirical study of all nations for the period 1930–89, they conclude that there is a
signiﬁcant but fairly weak relationship between population growth and interstate
militarized conflict and war, but that population density has no effect.
Territory is undoubtedly the resource studied most extensively in the context of
conflict. Numerous studies, including several quantitative ones, have underlined the
role of territorial issues in armed conflict. For example, Holsti (1991: 307) con-
cludes that among interstate wars in the period 1648–1989, territorial issues were by
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far the most important single issue category: initially ﬁguring in about half the wars,
they eventually declined eventually to one-third in the post-World War II period.
Only for the period 1815–1914 is territory tied for ﬁrst place with an issue he calls
‘maintain integrity of state/empire’, arguably in itself a form of territorial conflict.
Reanalyzing Holsti’s data, Vasquez (1993: 130; 1995: 284) ﬁnds that between 79
and 93 % of wars over the ﬁve time periods involve territorially-related issues. Huth
(1996: 5) in a study of territorial disputes 1950–90 characterizes this issue as ‘one
of the enduring features of international politics’. The territorial explanation of war
also ﬁts in with the ﬁnding that most interstate violence occurs between neighbors
(Bremer 1992) or proximate countries (Gleditsch 1995). It is not always obvious
why such conflicts occur—is it because neighbors are more easily available for
conflict than other states, because of friction in their day-to-day interaction, or
because of disputed boundaries or territories? However, Vasquez (1995) presents a
strong case for the territorial explanation.
On the other hand, even where territory is conclusively shown to be a signiﬁcant
factor in armed conflict, the question remains whether the territory itself is at issue,
or the resources which may be found on it. For the general question which we
investigate here, either version will do. But for more precise theorizing about the
link between resources and conflict, we need to understand exactly which resource
is decisive. Some resources are probably too trivial to ﬁght over, while a resource
such as oil might be seen as economically essential. The territory itself might be
seen as important to the identity of a people and the symbolic function might be
more important than any material value. In a study of modern border disputes,
Mandel (1980: 435) hypothesized that ethnically-oriented border disputes would be
more severe than resource-oriented ones because ethnic issues seemed less tracta-
ble, more emotional, and less conducive to compromise. He was able to conﬁrm his
hypothesis in a study of interstate border disputes after World War II, using data
from Butterworth (1976). To extend the concept of ‘resources’ to include ethnic
afﬁliation or the symbolic value of ‘the land of our fathers’, would be possible, but
strained.
A rare empirical investigation of resource imperialism is found in a study by
Hammarström (1986, 1997), which examined how interventions in the Third World
by three major Western powers (France, UK, and the USA) in the period 1951–77
might be accounted for by the presence of economically and militarily essential
minerals in the less developed country. Hammarström’s results were essentially
negative: the importance of the less developed country as a supplier of minerals did
not affect the likelihood of intervention from the USA and the UK, and affected it
only slightly in the case of France. This ﬁnding also held for the subset of countries
within the sphere of influence of the major power, for the subset of minerals upon
which the major power was extremely dependent, and for regions rather than
individual countries. Hammarström cautions that he has tested the theory on the
basis of the theory of economic imperialism only, and that it might also have been
analyzed from the perspective of the East-West conflict. But since the major
Socialist powers had been largely self-sufﬁcient in raw materials, he felt that such a
test would be unlikely to produce very different results.
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Anthropologists have studied the influence of environmental factors on tribal
warfare in single cases. For instance, Graham (1975) attributes considerable
importance to environmental factors in the explanation of the endemic intertribal
warfare among the Yuman societies of the Colorado and Gila rivers. As far as
modern warfare is concerned, however, there appears to be little systematic evi-
dence. For example, the comprehensive Handbook of War Studies (Midlarsky
1989) does not list ‘ecology’, ‘environment’, ‘land’, ‘raw materials’, or ‘water’ in
its index.6 Neither do the indices of such classical studies of war as Richardson
(1960) or Wright (1942/1965).7 Within the Correlates of War project—the largest
modern research project of its kind—one article ﬁnds limited support for the idea
that population pressure may be a factor in war initiation (Bremer et al. 1973); but
generally environmental factors do not seem to have attracted much attention.
Choucri/North (1975) have also investigated the effects of population growth in the
international processes that led up to World War I. However, in a more recent
wide-ranging book by North (1990), both the environment and war are discussed
extensively but the two seem hardly to intersect. In general, those who have
researched the general patterns of war have been much more concerned with alli-
ances, power conﬁgurations, and other elements of realist theory (and more recently
with democracy, economic interdependence, and other elements of liberal theory)
than with environmental factors. It is possible, of course, that this is because
environmental factors simply do not play much of a role in warfare—but one would
feel more conﬁdent of this conclusion if environmental hypotheses had at least been
tested. Another explanation for the relative neglect of these factors could be that the
environmental boundaries of state policy have not been central to the grand political
debate until quite recently. Moreover, most research on international conflict has
focused on national, dyadic, and systematic attributes for understanding interna-
tional behavior, whereas the issues involved in conflict have generally been ignored
—including, presumably, environmental issues (Diehl 1992).
Domestic armed conflict is dominant in the single case studies on the effects of
environmental degradation. But there is even less comparative and quantitative
work here than in relation to interstate conflict. Wallensteen/Sollenberg (1997:
343), in a study of armed conflicts after the Cold War (the vast majority of which
have been domestic) show that in slightly more than half the conflicts the basic
incompatibility concerned territory rather than government. Conflicts over territory
were less frequently terminated (or only tentatively terminated with a ceaseﬁre) and
were less frequently the subject of peace agreements. The article by Hauge/
Ellingsen (1998) stands out as fairly unique in trying to integrate environmental
6More recently, Midlarsky (1995) has investigated how the lack of warfare and two environmental
variables (rainfall and sea borders) exert positive effects on democracy and the impact of
democracy on environmental policies (1998).
7With the exception that Wright’s book contains a few references to environmental factors in
‘primitive warfare’, for example, that ‘primitive peoples in extremely cold and extremely hot
climates tend to ‘be unwarlike’, while in general ‘a temperate or warm, somewhat variable and
stimulating climate favors warlikencss’ (Wright 1965: 63, 552–554).
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degradation into a more general model of civil war and test it in a large-N mode.
They conclude that environmental degradation does stimulate the incidence of
conflict, but less so than political or economic variables and that the severity of such
conflicts is better accounted for by military spending. Their study is limited to three
types of environmental degradation which mainly affect poor countries and covers a
relatively limited time-span (1990–92).
6.3 Nine Common Problems
Apart from the role of population factors and territory in armed conflict there is,
then, a notable lack of systematic research on the effects or resource or environ-
mental factors on armed conflict. In the absence of solid evidence, the ﬁeld has been
left wide open to speculation and conjecture. Thus, in debating population pressure,
even serious academics are driven to support their respective positions in the US
debate by referring to the sparsity of population that anyone can observe out of an
airplane window (Bolch/Lyons 1993: 27) or the obvious overpopulation which is
evident when one drives in a major city at rush hour (Ehrlich/Ehrlich 1996: 211).
Such low standards of evidence make it difﬁcult to assess the state of the art. In
what follows, I will concentrate on work with more solid claims to seriousness.
Even within this literature, however, there are many problems. This article dis-
cusses nine of them, in no particular order.
6.3.1 Resource Scarcity or Environmental Degradation?
Many of the references to ‘environmental’ factors that are posited as capable of
stimulating an arms race or triggering a war are unclear as to whether the causal
factor is absolute resource scarcity or environmental degradation. Virtually all
resources are ‘scarce’—to some degree, at some times, or in some places. By
deﬁnition, scarcity leads to conflict in the sense of conflict of interest. It can even be
argued that all conflicts of interest derive from scarcity. However, not all resource
conflicts lead to overt conflict behavior, and even fewer to the use of force.
Environmental degradation may exacerbate resource conflicts because it reduces the
quantity or quality or the resource in question. Pollution of a river, for instance,
reduces the quality of the water; but it can also be interpreted as reducing the
quantity of clean water, and therefore contributing to increased scarcity. Similarly,
air pollution in a city degrades the quality of the air and changes an unlimited public
good (clean air) into a scarce one.
Libiszewski (1992: 2) argues that simple resource conflicts are very common,
but that the concept of environmental conflict calls for a more restricted use. The
latter he deﬁnes as a conflict caused by a human-made disturbance of the normal
regeneration rate of a renewable resource (Libiszewski 1992: 6). Thus, a conflict
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over agricultural land is an ‘environmental conflict’ if the land becomes an object of
contention as a result of soil erosion, climate change, and so on, but not in the case
of an ordinary territorial or colonial conflict or an anti-regime civil war aiming at
the redistribution of land. Non-renewable natural resources (such as oil) are not
integrated in any eco-system. Their depletion may lead to economic problems, but
they are not in themselves environmental problems, so conflicts over such resources
should not be considered environmental conflicts.
Libiszewski’s distinction between those conflicts which result from simple
resource scarcity and those which result from environmental degradation is useful.
When, for instance, Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994) refers to ‘environmental scarcity’,
the terminology itself muddies the waters. In the following, within the bounds of the
practical, I will try to keep the two apart. However, I ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to follow
Libiszewski in linking environmental conflict to the concept of an eco-system, with
its questionable overtones of balance and equilibrium.8
Even the distinction between simple resource scarcity and environmental deg-
radation raises some problems. Today’s simple scarcity may well be the result of
environmental mismanagement in the past. The lack of forests around Madrid may
be seen as a fact of nature today, but can be interpreted as a result of excessive
ship-building in the 16th century, and thus as an old case of environmental deg-
radation. Most, if not all, territorial conflict can be seen as the result of past
population policies (or a lack thereof) which have permitted groups to multiply
beyond what their traditional territories could support. As far as the present is
concerned, however, this distinction sets a useful standard.
6.3.2 Deﬁnitions and Polemics
The term environmental security was launched to place the environment on the
agenda of ‘high politics’ (Lodgaard 1992: 113). If one adopts a broad conception of
security as ‘the assurance people have that they will continue to enjoy those things
that are most important to their survival and well-being’ (Soroos 1997a: 236), it can
be plausibly argued that serious environmental degradation can indeed threaten
security. This would be particularly true if the most serious warnings about global
warming or holes in the ozone layer turn out to be correct, but even more traditional
environmental concerns like air and water pollution can kill more people than
smaller armed conflicts or even wars. Politically, then, it makes sense to give such
8Libiszewski speaks (1992: 3) of ‘a dynamic equilibrium oscillating around an ideal average’.
Whether such equilibria exist in anything but the short term, seems questionable. At least it is
implausible that only human intervention can change them. Otherwise, it would be difﬁcult to
explain the disappearance of the dinosaurs and other animals long before human beings were
numerous enough to have much influence on the global environment, or even before human beings
existed. Or should we see the emergence of the dinosaurs, as well as their subsequent disap-
pearance, as part of an ‘ideal’ world?
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issues very high priority. Like common security, structural violence, or sustainable
development, environmental security made a good slogan—so successful that the
US Department of Defense now has a position called ‘Principal Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security)’, the NATO Science
Committee is running a series of workshops on environmental security (Gleditsch
1997), and NATO’s Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society is conducting
a pilot study on the same topic (Carius et al. 1996). Defense establishments in many
countries in NATO and among the cooperating partners in East and Central Europe
are rushing to acquire a green image by improving their environmental performance.
But political success does not necessarily make a slogan into a workable
research tool (Graeger 1996). Merging two objectives like security and environ-
mental protection into a joint term does not give us new theoretical or empirical
insight into whether the two are mutually supportive—or in competition. Those
who on the basis of the broad deﬁnition of security deliberately disregard the
question of armed conflict are in a sense on fairly safe ground.9 But most of the
literature cannot resist the temptation to bring the danger of armed conflict back in,
as a consequence of environmental degradation (Gleditsch 1997; Lodgaard 1992).
Indeed, why else would armed forces and military alliances be so interested in
environmental security?
On this point, the critical literature (Deudney 1990; Levy 1993) does not take us
much further. In part, this literature engages in similar deﬁnitional exercises in order
to prove the futility of the concept of environmental security. In addition, it dem-
onstrates theoretical and empirical problems in the writings on the environment and
security. Some of the critical points are well taken, but if they do not end up in an
alternative or improved research design, they are of little help.
6.3.3 Overlooking Important Variables
If we could prove that human activity could shift the average global temperature by,
for example, 5°, this would be a very important ﬁnding. No climate researcher
would argue, however, that human activity is the one and only determinant of
global temperature. Anyone who correlated emissions of greenhouse gases with
temperatures recorded monthly would seem patently ridiculous, since the effect of
human activity is likely to be completely swamped by long-established seasonal
variations. In the social sciences, such caution is often thrown to the winds. Far too
many analyses of conflict and the environment are based not only on bivariate
analysis but also on overly simplistic reasoning.
9There is still a danger of conceptual slippage, by including all manner of environmental problems
in the concept of environmental security, and not just those which are serious enough to be treated
on a par with war destruction. This development is reminiscent of the fate of the concept of
structural violence (Galtung 1969), which was so successful in the short term that it came to
include any social ill—and eventually self-destructed.
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The greatest weakness in this respect is that much of this literature ignores
political, economic, and cultural variables. When writers on environmental conflict
refer to the ‘214 shared river systems’ as potential sources of conflict, they rarely
distinguish between rivers which run through poor, undemocratic, politically
unstable countries ridden by ethnic tensions, and rivers running through stable and
affluent countries. It is tacitly assumed that resource conflicts have a high potential
for violence, regardless of the countries’ political system or economic orientation.
Since democracies rarely if ever ﬁght one another (Gleditsch/Hegre 1997; Russett
1993) and since they rarely experience civil war (Hegre et al. 2001) there is no
reason to believe that they will suddenly start ﬁghting over resource issues between
themselves, or internally, any more than over other issues. Moreover, if it is correct
that democracies generally display more benign environmental behavior than do
non-democracies,10 then democracies are also less likely to generate the kind of
extreme environmental degradation which may be assumed to generate violent
conflict. Thus, democracy may have a double effect in preventing armed conflict
over the environment: it generates fewer serious problems, and it provides other
means of conflict resolution once these problems have arisen.
Most work on environmental conflict does not discuss how regime type may
influence such conflict. For example, in the many case studies published as project
reports by Homer-Dixon and his associates, there are general references to ‘key
social and political factors’ (Percival/Homer-Dixon 1993: 3), to corruption,
weakened legitimacy, resource capture by elites, and so on. However, words such
as ‘democracy’ or ‘autocracy’ do not occur in the model. In view of the extensive
theoretical and empirical literature relating the degree of democracy to civil vio-
lence in an inverted U-curve (Muller/Weede 1990) a democracy variable should
have been included explicitly. The reports frequently hover around the idea that
democratic procedures might have something to do with the level of conflict. Yet,
none of the reports clearly state that democracy matters, or in what way.
Furthermore, the work by Homer-Dixon and his associates is on the whole more
sensitive to political variables than most studies in this ﬁeld.
Many of the militarized interstate disputes between democracies have been over
resources—or more speciﬁcally over one particular resource, ﬁsh (Bailey 1997;
Russett 1993: 21) At sea, boundaries between states are not yet well settled, and
even where they are established by law or by custom, they are not visible. The
fluidity of any sea boundary makes it more conflict-prone than an established land
boundary. Moreover, ﬁsh stocks straddle national boundaries and migrate across
them with the seasons, with no concern for the consequences for human conflict. It
is not surprising, then, that international ﬁsheries should be ridden with conflict.
However, even if ﬁsheries conflicts between democracies may involve some use of
force or threats to use it, such conflicts rarely, if ever, escalate to the point where
human life is lost. Since ‘war’ is usually deﬁned as a conflict with more than 1,000
10As argued by Payne (1995), Gleditsch/Sverdrup (1995), and Gleditsch (1997a); Midlarsky
(1998) is more sceptical.
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dead (Small/Singer 1982; Wallensteen/Sollenberg 1997), terms such as ‘cod war’ or
‘turbot war’ (Soroos 1997b) are misnomers. Moreover, these conflicts usually
involve one private party (a ﬁshing vessel) against representatives of another state
(a warship or a coastguard vessel). When such conflicts occur between democra-
cies, the two states take particular care not to engage in force or threats of force
between their own representatives. Thus, as far as the militarized part of the con-
flicts is concerned, these disputes are not really ‘interstate’.
A similar point holds for economic variables. Much of the environmental lit-
erature lacks explicit recognition of the fact that material deprivation is one of the
strongest predictors of civil war. Moreover, economically highly developed coun-
tries rarely ﬁght one another (Mueller 1989), although this regularity is less absolute
than the democratic peace. Finally, while economic development does tend to
exacerbate certain environmental problems (such as pollution and excessive
resource extraction) up to a point, the most advanced industrial economies also tend
to be relatively more resource-friendly. Hence, resource competition is likely to be
less ﬁerce domestically as well as externally among the most highly developed
countries. Going back to the example of shared water resources, highly developed
countries have very strong economic motives for not ﬁghting over scarce water
resources; instead, they use technology to expand the resources or ﬁnd cooperative
solutions in exploiting them. Poor countries generate more local environmental
problems, which in turn may exacerbate their poverty and which is also conducive
to conflict. Certain types of environmental degradation—like deforestation, lack of
water and sanitation, and soil erosion—are part and parcel of underdevelopment.
6.3.4 Untestable Models
While there is much single-factor reasoning, some work goes to the opposite
extreme. In a series of reports and articles which represent some of the most solid
case-oriented work in the ﬁeld, Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994) employs a very com-
plex theoretical scheme, where four basic social effects of environmental disruption
(decreased regional agricultural production, population displacement, decreased
economic productivity, and disruption of institutions) may produce scarcity con-
flicts, group-identity conflicts, and relative-deprivation conflicts. This model has
been reproduced in various forms in a number of publications from the Toronto
Group, and by others (cf. Hauge/Ellingsen 1998: 301).
Some problematic aspects of these complex models are clearly seen in the case
studies from Homer-Dixon and his associates. The rebellion in Chiapas
(Howard/Homer-Dixon 1995), for example, is explained by seven (mostly eco-
nomic) independent variables acting through nine intervening variables and one
additional independent variable. Violence in Gaza (Kelly/Homer-Dixon 1995)
involves an explanatory scheme of eight independent and intervening variables,
which in turn draw on a six-variable scheme for explaining three kinds of water
scarcity and a ten-variable scheme for explaining the increasing level of grievance
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against the Palestine National Authority. Whether in a large-N or a comparative
case study mode, such a comprehensive scheme would be very difﬁcult to test.
Empirical testing is not helped by the fact that many of the variables are rather
imprecise, such as ‘health problems’. Similar problems can be found in the work of
Lee (1996) who has done interesting case studies of Sudan and Bangladesh.
Of course, single-factor reasoning and overly complex models do not go toge-
ther. But the joint effect of the two phenomena is a lack of modestly multivariate
analyses and of a gradualistic approach to model-building. This is not an argument
against the development of large and complex models, like those developed in
macroeconomics, some of which have also been applied to environmental problems
(Nordhaus 1994). But such models must be built gradually, with more limited
modules being put to the test ﬁrst.
6.3.5 The Lack of a Control Group
Qualitative and quantitative research serve the same logic of inference, although
their styles are different (King et al. 1994: 3). In the literature on the environment
and armed conflict, the case study has been by far the dominant approach.
Homer-Dixon (1991: 83) criticized earlier writing on this topic as ‘anecdotal’ and
has added (Homer-Dixon 1994) a number of carefully documented case studies
analyzed on the basis of his detailed theoretical scheme. Levy (1995: 56) argues
that Homer-Dixon’s case studies offer ‘more anecdotes, but not more understand-
ing’. Recent studies from Homer-Dixon’s project deal with Gaza (Kelly/Homer-
Dixon 1995), South Africa (Percival/Homer-Dixon 1995, 1998) and Chiapas
(Howard/Homer-Dixon 1995). Similarly, the Environment and Conflicts Project at
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology has carried out a number of case studies,
recently published in three volumes (Bächler et al. 1996).
The charge that such case studies are anecdotal cannot easily be dismissed, in
that all of them are single case studies of ‘environmental scarcity and violent
conflict’. They offer no variation on the dependent variable,11 thus violating an
important principle of research design, whether the approach is qualitative or
quantitative (King et al. 1994: 108). Other projects based on single case studies (e.g.
Lee 1996) suffer from the same problem. Regardless of the accuracy of the his-
torical description and the excellence of the theoretical model, these studies fail to
provide an empirical basis for comparison. In the Toronto Group’s study of
Chiapas, for example, ‘weak property rights’ is a factor in creating ‘persistent
structural scarcities’ which in turn contributes to the outbreak of rebellion
(Howard/Homer-Dixon 1995: 23). But in order to evaluate the causal nature of this
link, we need to examine cases without conflict, many of which will certainly also
11Nor, for that matter, do they provide any variation on the independent variable, but that is not
necessarily a problem in the research design, cf. King et al. (1994: 137).
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be characterized by weak property rights. Only when we know that conflict occurs
more frequently in the former group, can we even begin to think about causal links.
Homer-Dixon and associates justify this method by arguing that ‘biased case
selection enhances understanding of the complex relationships among variables in
highly interactive social, political, economic, and environmental systems’
(Percival/Homer-Dixon 1998: 279; Homer-Dixon 1996). There are two problems
with this argument. One is that it seems to imply that environmental problems are
more complex than other social (or for that matter physical) phenomena that
researchers study. No justiﬁcation is given for this view. I would argue, on the
contrary, that any social system is as complex as the theory developed to study it. In
other words, the complexity is in the mind of the beholder rather than in the
phenomenon itself. Second, almost any methodological limitation can be justiﬁed at
an exploratory stage. The problem arises if the project does not move on to the next
stage, but instead concludes on the basis of the exploratory case studies that
‘environmental scarcity causes violent conflict’ (Homer-Dixon 1994: 39).
Even some of the best quantitative studies on resources and war, those on
territorial conflict, suffer from the same problem. Both Holsti (1991) and Vasquez
(1993) derive their ﬁndings concerning the territorial basis of armed conflict from
an examination of the issues involved in the armed conflict. However, they do not
examine situations which did not escalate to armed conflict to see if also they
contained unresolved territorial issues. Huth (1996), who studies territorial disputes
and not just wars, does not include territorial claims which are not expressed
publicly (Huth 1996: 24, 239). For example, the question of the Finnish territories
conquered by the Soviet Union in the Winter War of 1939–40 could not be raised
during the Cold War due to Finland’s somewhat precarious position. Thus, if one
wanted to test a hypothesis about conditions under which territorial disagreements
are completely suppressed, Huth’s dataset would not be suitable.12
In examining only cases of conflict, one is likely to ﬁnd at least partial conﬁr-
mation of whatever one is looking for, unless there are very clearly speciﬁed criteria
for the threshold level of the independent variable assumed to lead to violence. No
society is completely free of environmental degradation, nor is any society com-
pletely free of ethnic fragmentation, religious differences, economic inequalities, or
problems of governance. From a set of armed conflicts, one may variously conclude
that they are all environmental conflicts, ethnic conflicts, clashes of civilizations, or
products of bad governance. Indeed, conflicts like the internationalized civil war in
Ethiopia from the mid-1970s have been described in most of these terms. Only by
adopting a research design where cases of conflict and non-conflict are contrasted
can the influence of the various factors be sorted out.
12Another problem, peculiar to the literature on territory and armed conflict, is that regardless of
the issue which started the conflict, the contestants need a territorial base to deploy force of any
size; even guerrillas need some sort of safe haven. Thus, armed conflicts, domestic as well as
international, at least when they escalate to a certain size, become conflicts over territory even if
territory was not the most salient issue from the start.
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6.3.6 Reverse Causality
It is well established—and in a sense not very surprising—that modern war wreaks
havoc on the environment (see e.g. Westing 1990, 1997). The Vietnam War
brought this issue to public attention, although earlier large wars had also caused
destruction of vital infra-structure and generated other negative environmental
effects. More recently, the prospect of a ‘nuclear winter’ pointed to the prospect of
the obliteration of human activity on the Northern hemisphere as a result of the
environmental effects of a nuclear war. For instance, Sagan/Turco (1993) main-
tained that a global nuclear war could lead to a worldwide fall in temperature of 15–
20 °C. Even more optimistic scenarios than this could put the earth’s climate back
to the most recent ice age. These environmental effects could be worse than the
direct impact of nuclear war such as blast, ﬁre, and radioactive fallout. Today, the
campaign to abolish landmines has focused public attention on the long-term
environmental effects of a weapon long after its military utility has gone.
This war-environment relationship is sometimes confused with the possibility
that environmental degradation causes armed conflict and war. For instance, in
arguing for a link from the environment to violent conflict, Holst (1989: 126) points
out that ﬁve of the six countries on the UN list of countries most seriously affected
by hunger had experienced civil war (Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Mozambique, and
Angola). However, it is highly probable that the violent uprising contributed to the
hunger, or even that starvation was used as a weapon of war in some of these
conflicts. Thus the most important causal link is very likely the opposite of that
indicated by Holst.
A slightly more complicated relationship is suggested by McMichael (1993:
322) as a positive feedback process: ‘environmental destruction and resource
scarcity promote war which, when it breaks out, further increases environmental
destruction and resource depletion’. However, a somewhat different feedback
process seems more likely:
war ! environmental destruction! resource conflict
! exacerbated armed conflict
This process starts from a well-documented relationship rather than from a more
conjectural one. It also contains in the endpoints the process of violence repeating
itself over time, which has been found to be highly signiﬁcant in studies of inter-
state war (Raknerud/Hegre 1997) as well as civil war (Hegre et al. 2001). Of course,
if the process were to continue indeﬁnitely, these two feedback cycles would be
identical. Moreover, the world would have entered a process of accelerating dete-
rioration and violence. Studies of interstate war and civil war indicate that violence
is repeated, but not always, and not as a rule with increased intensity. Rather, it may
be thought of as an echo, always weaker than the signal it reflects, and petering out
in the end. Thus, it does matter whether the process starts with war or with envi-
ronmental degradation.
6.3 Nine Common Problems 95
6.3.7 Using the Future as Evidence
Homer-Dixon, and many other authors in this area, have stressed the potential for
violent conflict in the future. There is a lack of empirical study of armed conflicts in
the past as well as a lack of explicit theorizing for if and why resource scarcities
should have a higher violence-generating potential in the future than in the past.
Much of the literature deals with conflicts of interest involving potential violence
rather than with actual violence. For example, no one is really arguing that any
armed conflict in the past has occurred mainly because of water issues. To argue
that water has been a main issue in the many conflicts in the Middle East, and
speciﬁcally in the wars between Israel and its neighbors, would be to seriously
underestimate the explosive ethnic and territorial issues in the region (Lonergan
1997: 383). The argument is entirely in terms of future wars which may happen. In
Silent Spring, arguably the most influential environmentalist book ever published,
Carson (1962: Chap. 1) described in the past tense ‘a town in the heart of America’
hit by mysterious diseases caused by the excessive use of pesticides, but in fact this
was ‘a fable for tomorrow’. Similarly, when Ehrlich/Ehrlich (1968: 11) started The
Population Bomb with a statement that ‘The battle to feed all of humanity is over’,
went on to predict that hundreds of millions of people would starve to death, and
then discussed the political consequences, they were arguing from future empirical
‘evidence’ which in fact turned out to be wrong. While they now hold that the
principal problem ‘of course’ is not acute famine, but malnutrition (Ehrlich/Ehrlich
1996: 76), they also argue that there is every reason to think that the limits to the
expansion of plant yields is not far off (Ehrlich/Ehrlich 1996: 80) and liken the
human race to animal populations which grow beyond their carrying capacity until
they ‘crash’ to a far lower size (Ehrlich/Ehrlich 1968: 67). These are hypotheses
based on controversial theory and debatable extrapolations, rather than ‘data’ which
may conﬁrm the predictions.
In principle, the future may always differ from the past. Despite whatever
painstaking empirical mapping we may have made of past wars, future wars may
run a different course. Environmental organizations and other advocacy movements
are prone to argue that we are now at a turning-point in human history and that
patterns from the past may no longer hold in the future. In saying this, one may
easily slip into prophecy. ‘There will be water wars in the future’ is no more a
testable statement than the proverbial ‘The End of the World is at Hand!’, unless
terms such as ‘the future’ and ‘at hand’ are clearly speciﬁed. In an effort to make
pessimistic environmental predictions more precise (and to prove them wrong) the
economist Julian Simon has repeatedly challenged his opponents to place bets on
resource issues. Three environmentalists took him up on this in 1980 and bet that
the price of a basket of ﬁve metals would rise over a ten-year period. Simon, who
thought they would decline, ended up winning the bet (Myers/Simon 1994: 99,
206). To my knowledge, no one has issued bets on environmental degradation and
warfare, but conceivably this might be a useful strategy in order to provoke greater
scholarly precision.
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6.3.8 Foreign and Domestic Conflict
Since the end of World War II a large majority of wars have been domestic rather
than interstate (Gleditsch 1996: 294). Although the number of domestic armed
conflicts, whether the smaller ones or the larger conflicts conventionally called
‘wars’, has declined slightly after the end of the Cold War (Wallensteen/Sollenberg
1997), they remain much more numerous than international armed conflicts. This
pattern is unlikely to be broken in the foreseeable future.
Homer-Dixon’s work is explicitly related to domestic conflicts, and Tir/Diehl
(1998: 319) argue that most studies of population pressures and war focus on
internal conflict. Yet, much of the reasoning about the prevalence of scarce
resources as a factor in war is built on lessons from the study of interstate war, as
my literature review above indicates. Both at the theoretical and empirical level, the
study of interstate conflict has been conducted largely separately from the study of
civil war. Some factors are similar, but one cannot easily generalize from one to the
other. An obvious difference is that many theories of war at the interstate level are
related to the absence of any overarching system of power, i.e. what realists call
international anarchy. At the domestic level, war is often related to revolt against
excessive state power or its abuse. Many issues which stimulate armed conflicts at
the interstate level may be too weak to force a break within a society held together
by a central authority. Theories linking environmental degradation to violence
therefore need to be quite speciﬁc concerning whether they are addressing domestic
or interstate violence. At this stage it is probably appropriate to have separate
explanatory models for the two phenomena—at least in the absence of some bold
theoretical thinking concerning how to link theories of violence at the domestic and
interstate levels.
6.3.9 Levels of Analysis
Studies of war require precision about the unit of analysis. For example, in studies
of democratic peace, it is frequently assumed that if democracies do not ﬁght one
another, then there will be more peace as the fraction of democracies grows. I have
shown elsewhere (Gleditsch/Hegre 1997), that this holds true only under certain
conditions. Under a plausible set of assumptions, an increase in the number of
democracies is more likely to lead initially to an increase in the frequency of war in
the system. Only later, after the degree of democracy is above a certain level, will
further democratization decrease the probability of war. Similarly, we cannot
automatically generalize theories and empirical evidence concerning resource and
environmental factors from one level to another. Below, follow three hypotheses
about interstate armed conflict using the same independent and dependent variables,
but at different levels of analysis:
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(1) System level: In a world with high resource constraints, there will be more
interstate conflict.
(2) Nation level: Countries with high resource constraints are more likely to be
involved in conflicts with other countries.
(3) Dyadic level: Countries with high resource constraints are likely to be
involved in conflict with countries with an ample supply of the same resource,
and even (but to a lesser extent) with other countries with the same resource
constraints.
Although these three hypotheses are derived from the same kind of thinking, the
one does not logically follow from the other. If we assume that the overall fre-
quency of interstate war is regulated mostly by systemic factors (such as the balance
of power), or that states’ propensity to war is largely determined by national
characteristics like regime type or wealth, resource factors may still determine the
direction of warfare (i.e. dyadic war). Thus, even if resource scarcities are relevant
for ‘who ﬁghts whom’, that is not equivalent to saying that global resource scarcity
determines the overall level of armed conflict. This problem of levels is not, to my
knowledge, dealt with at any length in the relevant literature, which freely jumps
between the dyad, the nation, and the system levels for theory as well as empirical
evidence.
6.4 The Way Ahead
The nine problems discussed above add up to a fairly pessimistic assessment of the
state of the study of environmental causes of conflict. Even leading studies in the
ﬁeld come up against fairly elementary problems in theory construction or empirical
testing. Critical studies, like those of Deudney and Levy, are valuable in pointing
out some of these problems. But the critique will serve to advance the ﬁeld only if it
stimulates more satisfactory research.
Systematic cross-national study by social scientists of any aspect of the envi-
ronment is in its infancy. On the positive side, we may note that economists have
done a great deal of research on how economic development drives environmental
stress. A common ﬁnding in this literature is that the rate of emissions of envi-
ronmentally harmful products increases with growing wealth, but not linearly;
rather the environmental damage tapers off at high levels of development. It is clear
that for some noxious emissions (such as SO2) there is a signiﬁcant decrease at very
high levels of economic development, because rich countries can afford to acquire
modern technology and also because their decision-makers put a higher premium
on a clean environment.13
In recent work on democracy and the environment (Gleditsch/Sverdrup 2002;
Midlarsky 1998) attempts have been made to relate indicators of the environmental
13Dietz/Rose (1997) provide a brief survey of recent writings.
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performance of nations to their regime characteristics. The conclusions from these
two empirical analysis are at some variance with one another. Generally, the study
of political predictors of environmental degradation lags far behind the study of
economic factors.
There is even less rigorous work using environmental degradation as a predictor
to conflict. The work by Tir/Diehl (1998) and Hauge/Ellingsen (1998) is relevant
and representative of a tradition in theoretically-grounded empirical research on
armed conflict, based on cross-national (and, to a more limited degree,
cross-temporal) data for all nations. Both these analyses place the analysis of
resource and environmental variables squarely within a multivariate perspective.
Both studies do indeed ﬁnd an effect of such variables—population growth in one
study; deforestation, land degradation, and low availability of fresh water in the
other. Since all these predictor variables are traditionally associated with poverty,
this raises the issue if the association between conflict and environmental load (as in
the Tir and Diehl study) or conflict and environmental degradation (in Hauge and
Ellingsens’s work) may be primarily an underdevelopment problem. Highly
developed (or even ‘overdeveloped’) countries also have environmental problems
(trafﬁc noise, industrial pollution, etc.) but there is no evidence that such envi-
ronmental issues generate armed conflict, internally or externally. In this sense,
perhaps environmental conflict should be analyzed as a development issue? At least
this is an avenue worth further exploration.
A striking feature of the existing empirical studies is the problem of gathering
valid and reliable data on the environmental behavior of nations or smaller geo-
graphical units. Environmental accounting is miles behind national economic
accounting. The environmental variables used in the Tir and Diehl and Hauge and
Ellingsen studies, and in Midlarsky (1998), are not very highly correlated overall. Is
this mainly caused by low data reliability, or because they tap different dimensions
of what might be called environmental performance? In order to answer this
question, and to move forward in relating environmental studies and the study of
armed conflict, we need major improvements in systematic data collection—a
Correlates of War project for the environment.
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